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SUMMARY
In this paper we develop a new macroeconomic model that will allow us to
analyse, using aggregate data at the provincial level within Spain, the relation-
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ship between the unemployment and homeownership rates, besides other
influential variables as the changes of the relative user costs of owning and
renting or household life-cycle attributes. The model constructed permits us to
question the evidence of OSWALD or partially of GREEN and HENDERSHOTT, that
is homeownership leads to higher unemployment. Our results point out
that, taking into account the simultaneity determination issue and reducing the
omitted variable bias, higher unemployment discourage homeownership.
1. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED RESEARCH
Several authors have presented evidence of the links existing between the
housing and the labour markets (HUGHES and MCCORMICK, 1987, BOVER et al.,
1989, BLANCHARD and KATZ, 1992, and recently, MCCORMICK, 1997, OSWALD,
1996, 1999, HENLEY, 2001, CAMERON and MUELLBAUER, 2001, or, GREEN and
HENDERSHOTT, 2001). On the one hand, it has been argued (BOVER et al., 1989)
that there are at least five sources of influence from the housing market onto
the labour one: The effect of housing tenure choice on labour mobility, the cost
of living effect on individuals, the cost of location effect on firms, the wealth
effect on regional spending, and finally, the expectation effect on the future
earnings derived from the movements of house and land prices. On the other
hand, the incidence of the labour market on the housing one is driven mainly
via the so called permanent income variable. Thus, there is a true bidirectional
influence in many aspects between both markets.
In the last years, different relevant contributions to this subject have been
carried out highlighting the first channel of influence between both markets
mentioned above. First, A.J. OSWALD (1996, 1999) has postulated a surprising
positive relation between homeownership and unemployment rates based on
the restrictive effect of this kind of tenure choice on labour mobility. OSWALD
provides multiple data over OECD countries and regions within countries (US
states and the regions of UK, Italy, France, Sweden, and Switzerland) to
support that homeownership and unemployment rates are positively correlated
across nations and regions. He concludes that countries or regions with 10
percentage points higher ownership rates have approximately 2 percentage
points higher the unemployment rate. This assertion helps him to explain an
important part of the rise in the unemployment rate in Europe since 1960 in
terms of the decline of the private house-rental market and the increase of
homeownership.
Later, GREEN and HENDERSHOTT (2001) examine the OSWALD’s argument
in the US using aggregate data by State and age-class, analysing the cross
sectional variation in changes in homeownership and unemployment rates
between 1970 and 1990, in order to abstract from the existence of state fixed
effects in levels and taking into account how ownership and unemployment
correlate with age (older cohorts generally have both higher homeownership
rates and lower unemployment rates than younger cohorts). They have encoun-
tered that only for the middle age-classes (35-64) is confirmed empirically this
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positive relation, but at the same time, there seems to be little evidence of the
existence of this relation for the youngest (less than 35) and the oldest age
classes (more than 65), as well as for the total population.
The main objective of this paper is to look through the existence of such a
positive relation between the homeownership and unemployment rates at the
provincial level within Spain. The implications of this fact could be very
serious from the point of view of the policy makers. As well OSWALD (1999)
points out, Spain has nowadays both the highest unemployment rate (12,7 per
cent in the third quarter of 2001) and one of the highest homeownership rates
(79,6 per cent in 1991) from the European countries and US states. Moreover,
some authors have pointed out the cultural importance of homeownership as a
differential characteristic of the housing market in Spain (EASTAWAY and SAN
MARTÍN, 1999). If that relation were true, it can be argued that promoting
homeownership by means of the housing policy, as it is the case of the most
of the developed countries and Spain is not an exception, creates negative
externalities through the private and social costs of the unemployment genera-
ted, in addition to the positive externalities suggested before by several au-
thors, as the increase in the success of children (GREEN and WHITE, 1997;
AARONSON, 2000), citizenship (DIPASQUALE and GLAESER, 1999), and a variety
of family outcomes and attitudes (ROSSI and WEBER, 1996).
In fact, at present the housing policy is, beyond all doubt, one of the
characteristic elements of the modern Welfare State. Although the justifica-
tions to the public intervention on the housing market are of different nature,
and do not escape from some controversy (see ROSEN, 1985, for a detailed
explanation), the main objective pursued is to facilitate the access to housing to
the citizens. The Spanish public administration, following this aim, have been
especially worried in the recent decades in managing, along its different levels
of government, a wide range of regulations and policies intended to reach this
objective even established in the Spanish Constitution (article 47).
In Spain, since the arrival of the democratic institutions in 1978, the
housing policies followed by the different public responsibles have favoured
especially the access to housing by ownership, disregarding other tenure mo-
des. This way, the different Spanish governments have become making stress
on the demand side, providing a variety of incentives and subsidies aimed to
increase the acquisitive capacity of the individuals (giving subsidies to the
housing acquisition, to the mortgage interest payments, including homeow-
nership tax allowances, etc.), and looking for palliate the existing wedge bet-
ween the housing sale prices and the level of revenues of the families. Meanw-
hile, on the supply side, the housing policy has been limited basically to the
regulation of the uses of land, legislation that has not been able to control
the speculation on land mainly at the urban level, and has not promoted appro-
priately the subsidised housing programs (Viviendas de Protección Oficial)
with both private and public participation (see EASTAWAY and SAN MARTIN,
1999, for a more detailed description of the Spanish housing policy).
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At the same time, the unemployment issue in Spain has turned dramati-
cally into one of the main problems for the Spanish families in the recent
decades. Even though certainly the unemployment rate in Spain has descended
in the last years from a level above 20 per cent by the middle of 90’s to the
current one around 12.7 per cent, it is still very above the registered one in the
rest of the OECD countries.
With these backgrounds in mind, one may deduce that the purpose of this
paper, that is to put into question the existence of a positive trade off between
the unemployment and the homeownership rates, it is of enormous importance,
not only as an internal matter of interest for the policy makers in Spain, but
also, to contribute with some additional empirical evidence that allows us to
corroborate or not if it is likely the hypothesis of OSWALD.
With this aim we have structured the paper in four sections. In the next
section we present the theoretical macroeconomic model that allows us to set
up the framework for displaying the bidirectional flows between the home-
ownership and unemployment rate. Next, we estimate a simultaneous equation
model with cross sectional aggregate data at the provincial level within Spain
in 1991, in order to calibrate the unemployment-homeownership relation along
the Spanish provinces. The last section draws conclusions. At the end we
include two appendixes, the Appendix A) showing the way we evaluate the
relative cost of owning and renting at the provincial level in Spain, and the
Appendix B) reviewing the sources of the data employed in the paper.
2. A MACROECONOMIC MODEL OF TENURE CHOICE
AND UNEMPLOYMENT
2.1. A MACROECONOMIC MODEL OF TENURE CHOICE
In the recent literature on housing tenure choice, the decisions taken by the
individuals on the tenure choice and the quantity of housing services demanded
are considered interdependent and simultaneous (ROSEN, 1979; MEGBOLUGBE,
et al., 1991). From this point of view, the tenure choice (TC) is usually model-
led as a discrete variable that depends on the same factors as the demand of
housing services. If we focus our attention on two of the tenure choice modes
most widely extended: owning and renting, a common specification is:
TC = f (COH/CRH, Yp, D) (1)
with f a certain function that depends on the variables COH/CRH, the relati-
ve cost of owning (COH) and renting (CRH), Yp the so called permanent income,
and D a vector of social and demographic characteristics of the households
reflecting life-cycle attributes.
A good number of studies that examine housing tenure choice are based on
micro data (ROSEN, 1979; HAURIN et al., 1994; BOURASSA, 1995; DI SALVO and
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ERMISCH, 1997; ÅSBERG, 1999; GREEN and VANDELL, 1999). In this case, the
equation (1) is interpreted from a probabilistic view, being TC the probability
that an individual opts for a certain tenure mode and f a probability distribution
function (generally normal or logistics).
Another way of looking at this question is from a macroeconomic perspec-
tive. Various authors have attempted to model, using aggregate data on some
territorial units, the observed rate of homeownership (π) in front of other
tenure modes. In this last situation it is the present paper, being necessary to
carry out some modifications to the specification (1) to obtain our theoretical
foundations. These are the following:
a) The first issue that arise from themacro view is the necessity to introdu-
ce an aggregate indicator of the relative cost of owning and renting
COH/CRH on some spatial units (ROSEN and ROSEN, 1980; HENDERS-
HOTT and SHILLING, 1982; EILBOTT and BINKOWSKI, 1985; GREEN and
VANDELL, 1999). This relative cost index is usually obtained by taking
into account the median household situation within each spatial unit
(income, mortgage contract, property and income taxes, house price
appreciation, median house values, median gross rents, etc.).
b) The model (1) is a static one and has been used basically in empirical
studies that were limited because of the lack of data from cross sectio-
nal microeconometric samples. However, from a macroeconomic point
of view, it could be more suitable to suppose that the households group-
ed in each territorial unit have taken their housing tenure decisions not
only under the period studied, but also along periods before. Thus, their
decisions on housing have been undertaken attending, not only to the
current relative user cost of owning and renting (COHt/CRHt), but also to
its past evolution (COHt-1/CRHt-1,...). Alternatively, this hypothesis
might be rethinked as a way to model the expectations made by the
households on the future evolution of the relative cost of owning and
renting in terms of the past information that they are likely to have (si-
milar assumptions are made by ROSEN and ROSEN, 1980, and, ROSEN et
al., 1984). Anyway, to agree with the usual suppositions in Housing
Economics, one may expect an inverse relationship between the formed
expectations on the relative user cost and the observed homeownership
rate, that is, if the formed expectation is that the relative user cost is
increasing (decreasing), then, the homeownership rate should decrease
(increase).
c) From the aggregated approach, it is difficult to obtain a properly
measure of the permanent income variable. For this reason, in this case,
most of the authors opt to include as proxy indicators the per capita
income, per capita disposable income, or, per capita consumption
ROSEN and ROSEN, 1980; ROSEN et al., 1984; EILBOTT and BINKOWSKI,
1985; GREEN and VANDELL, 1999). Anyway, it is more interesting to our
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objective that some authors have introduced as well the unemployment
rate (U) as a good proxy of the permanent income variable (DI SALVO
and ERMISCH, 1997).
d) The social and demographic variables commonly used in the aggrega-
ted models aimed to explain the housing tenure choice are, among
others less important: percentages of population by age-class, the ave-
rage number of members by household, or, the percentages of popula-
tion by marital status (alone, married, separated, divorced, widowed),
especially the percentage of married people. Generally speaking, the
empirical evidence have showed that the homeownership rate increases
with the ageing of population, at least to levels near the 65 years, as well
with variables that have a positive influence on the household forma-
tion, as it is the case of the rate of marriages, the rates of families with
children, etc. (ROSEN, 1979; EILBOTT and BINKOWSKI, 1985; HAURIN et
al., 1994, 1997; DIPASQUALE and WHEATON, 1996, pp. 186-188; GREEN
and VANDELL, 1999; ASBERG, 1999). Additionally, there is some evi-
dence that points out that increases in the population rates of separated,
divorced, or widowed, will decrease the homeownership rate (BOURAS-
SA, 1995).
Compiling all above, we arrive to a theoretical model that explains the
homeownership rate of the form:
πt = f (COHt/CRHt, COHt-1/CRHt-1,..., Ut, Dt) (2)
2.2. A MACROECONOMIC MODEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT
We develop here a parsimonious model that pursues to characterize the
rate of unemployment at the provincial level in Spain in connection with the
housing tenure mode. This model will allow us to scrutinise the OSWALD’s
evidence. Although up to now most of the models that relate the unemploy-
ment level and the housing tenure mode had formulated this relationship con-
centrating exclusively on the effects that generate the relative housing prices
on unemployment (BLANCHARD and KATZ, 1992; CAMERON and MUELLBAUER,
2001), our intention here is to specify a model that relates both directly, wi-
thout variables that make as proxies among them (this last situation is also the
case of OSWALD, 1996, or GREEN and HENDERSHOTT, 2001).
Apart from the homeownership rate, in the modern literature that attempts
to model the unemployment rate (BLANCHARD and SUMMERS, 1986; BENTOLILA
and BLANCHARD, 1990; LAYARD et al., 1991; OSWALD, 1996) stress is made in
the idea of hysteresis, and therefore that unemployment follows a certain auto-
regressive process, as well as in the existence of a wage curve (BLANCHFLOWER
and OSWALD, 1994), that is, the employees who work in areas of high un-
employment earn less, other things constant, than those who are surrounded by
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low unemployment. Following these ideas we arrive to a specification of the
form:
Ut = g (Ut-1, Ut-2,..., Yt, πt) (3)
being Ut the unemployment rate, Yt the per capita income, and πt the
homeownership rate. All other factors held constant, we expect a positive
influence on the current unemployment rate of its past values, and a negative
one of the per capita income variable. The sign of the influence of the tenure
variable is ambiguous and depends on the likelihood of the hypothesis of
OSWALD.
3. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL
WITHIN SPAIN
To obtain the empirical counterpart of the equations (2) and (3), and
keeping in mind the important lack of data for the homeownership rate in Spain
(the availability of the housing tenure mode rates in Spain is limited practically
to the information coming from the censuses of population and housing, that
have been carrying out every ten years, being the last one the realized in 1991),
we have started from cross sectional data in 1991, where the observation units
relapse on each one of the 46 Spanish provinces with a common regulation on
both income and property taxes.
In order to improve the models developed in the previous literature on our
matter of concern, we proceed in the following way:
First, to handle the simultaneity or endogeneity problem associated with
the relation between the unemployment and the homeownership rates, we
adopt a simultaneous equations approach at the time of estimating the system
that embraces equations (2) and (3), being employed instruments for both the
homeownership and unemployment rates.
Additionally, we will adopt as dependent variables, we will denominate it
respectively the homeownership and unemployment rates in each Spanish pro-
vince in 1991. This way, we ensure that any estimated rate from the regression
equations obtained will be properly defined between 0 and 1.
Finally, to reduce the omitted variable bias we include in both equations
other important influential factors. In particular, first we consider the following
explanatory (exogenous) variables in the tenure equation apart from the unem-
ployment rate:
a) ∆COH/CRH: As an approach to the expectations formed by the indivi-
duals on the relative user cost of owning and renting, we adopt the first
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difference of the ratio of the owning user cost on the renting one. This
is: ∆COH/CRH = COH t/CRH t - COH t-1/CRH t-1. Here, COH/CRH is an indi-
cator of the relative user cost on each Spanish province. We leave to the
appendix A) the technical issues relative to the definition of this indica-
tor in the Spanish context.
It could be supposed that this variable is inversely related with the ho-
meownership rate, that is, if ∆COH/CRH = 0, and it is not expected that
the relative cost varies, then, the homeownership rate will remain inva-
riable; instead, if ∆COH/CRH > 0 (< 0), and it is expected therefore that
the relative cost increases (diminishes), the homeownership rate will
spread to diminish (to increase).
b) PO2039: It represents the population’s percentage between 20 and 39
years, included both ends, on the total population of each Spanish pro-
vince. It is interesting to remark that the census information includes
population’s rates in intervals of 5 years age-classes. We have tried to
include all the possible populational rates corresponding to different
age-classes with the aim to detect those ones that influence significantly
in the homeownership rate, and at the end we obtained that this age-
class is the best explanatory variable in this case. We expect, in conso-
nance with the empiric literature, that increases in this variable dimi-
nish the observed homeownership rate, surely because it corresponds to
a segment of population that for their youth, they don’t generally access
to a house in property until superior age levels (or near to the 39 year-
old frontier). This is exactly what occur in EILBOTT and BINKOWSKI
(1985), or, GREEN and VANDELL (1999), for the segment of population
under 35 years.
c) DISEWI: This is the percentage of each province population that
presents the marital status of divorced, separated or widowed. We also
verified that variables as the rate of single or married population are
significant, being selected this variable finally because it improves the
adjustment of the regression notably as well as it reduces the standard
error of the regression. It is of foreseeing that this variable affects inver-
sely the homeownership rate (as it is the case in BOURASSA, 1995).
On the other hand, we choose as explanatory variables for the unemploy-
ment equation, apart from the homeownership rate, the following ones:
a) LINC: It is the logarithm of the per capita disposable income at the
province level in Spain. Under the usual hypothesis, increments in this
amount should decrease the observed unemployment and increase the
homeownership rate. Because this variable is highly correlated with
the unemployment rate, it is included in the unemployment equation
and not in the tenure equation. Nevertheless, it is included as an instru-
ment to estimate both equations.
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b) LUNE89: To reflect the hysteresis idea, we introduce the logarithm
of the unemployment rate at the province level with a time lag of
two years. We have tried to include in the model the unemployment
rate lagged both one and two years and in levels or logarithms. We
have encountered better levels of significance and fit with a logarithm
transformation and a time lag of two years.
We leave for the appendix B) the details on the sources of data used to
evaluate the above variables. It’s of highlight that we have not observed depen-
dence among the level of the relative cost of owning and renting and the
homeownership rate.
In consequence, the model of simultaneous determination of both the
homeownership and unemployment rates at the Spanish provinces level here
proposed will respond to the following equations
LOGITENi = α0 + α1PO2039i + α2DISEWIi + α3∆COHi/CRHi + α4UNEi + εI (4)
LOGIUNEi = β0 + β1LINCi + β2LUNE89i + β3TENi + ηi (5)
where the subindex i runs over the 46 Spanish provinces of common tax
legislation, and εi and ηi represents independent error terms.
To estimate this simultaneous equation system we have used the three
stage least squares procedure (3SLS) included in Limdep 7.0 econometric
software (for detailed information on this procedure see GREENE, 1997), with
all the exogenous variables as instruments. We do not include as instrument the
LUNE89 variable because the possibility of being correlated with the error
component. We resume the results obtained in table 1.
TABLE 1
3SLS estimation of the simultaneous system of equations (4)-(5)
Housing tenure choice equation (4)
Variables Coefficients t statistics
Levels of
significants
Mean
Values
Constant 9.273 11.022 0.0000
PO2039 - 18.436 - 9.031 0.0000 0.2927
DISEWI - 28.061 - 5.923 0.0000 0.0747
∆COH/CRH - 0.085 - 4.240 0.0000 1.7739
UNE - 1.553 - 2.297 0.0216 0.1558
Fit statistics
R2 0.7223 R2 0.6952
F 26.66
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Unemploymemt equation (5)
Variables Coefficients t statistics
Levels of
significants
Mean
Values
Constant 9.328 1.945 0.0518
LINC - 0.556 - 1.693 0.0905 13.8330
LUNE89 0.9606 7.227 0.0000 - 1.9095
TEN - 1.998 - 2.554 0.0106 0.7957
Fit statistics
R2 0.9079 R2 0.9014
F 138.10
From the estimated results, one may stand out the significance of the
variable associated to the relative cost of owning and renting, as well as the
signs presented by all the coefficients of the exogenous variables that are the
expected ones. Moreover, our findings suggest that there is a significant effect
between both the homeownership and the unemployment rates, but this effect
is negative in each other. Thus, with this model we confirm that in Spain,
higher levels of owner occupation do not lead to higher levels of unemploy-
ment, against what it is concluded from the evidence presented by OSWALD.
At the same time, we have obtained what it maybe seen as a more natural
relation, that unemployment clearly discourage the access in property to
housing. Particularly, we encountered that at the mean values, Spanish
provinces with 10 percentage points higher unemployment rates have
approximately 2.5 percentage points lower the homeownership rate. HENLEY
(2001) arrives to similar conclusions from microeconometric data in UK.
Therefore, one may explain the persistence in Spain of high levels of
both owner occupation and unemployment in front of the evidence for other
countries and regions as presented by OSWALD (1996, 1999) or GREEN and
HENDERSHOTT (2001), in terms of the cultural importance of homeownership in
Spain. Anyway, in Spain as it comes off from the results here obtained, the
persecution of two objectives of economic policy as they are to facilitate
the access to housing in property and the reduction of the unemployment, are
not in opposition to each other as it could be deduced from the works of
OSWALD or GREEN and HENDERSHOTT. Moreover, any advance in one of these
two objectives will redound in an improvement of the other one.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In the recent literature that concerns on the link existing between the
homeownership and unemployment rates there is some controversy on the
nature and the properly direction of this relation.
User cost changes, unemployment and homeownership: evidence from Spain 271
To contribute to this discussion, in this work we propose a methodology to
model and quantify this relationship through a macroeconomic model that
relates both the homeownership and the unemployment rates in a simultaneous
system of equations, together with other influential variables as a measure of
the relative cost of owning and renting, other sociodemographic variables and
income indicators. The particularity of the model resides in that the observa-
tion units, instead of being the observed behaviour of the individuals, relapse
on the behaviour of the residential real estate markets at the Spanish provinces
level.
The results obtained permit us to put into question the hypothesis of
OSWALD, that is, homeownership limits the efficient matching of jobs within
the labour market. Moreover, based on aggregate data from OECD countries
and regions within countries, OSWALD (1996, 1999), and subsequently GREEN
and HENDERSHOTT (2001) partially for middle-aged households, has stated that
countries or regions with 10 percentage point higher homeownership rates
have approximately 2 percentage point higher unemployment. However, the
Spanish regions or provinces were not included in the data base of those
studies.
Here, we have intended to solve some objections observed in those pre-
vious works, in particular, to deal with the problem of endogeneity, to reduce
the omitted variable bias, and to inspect what occur within a country, Spain,
that is persistently characterized by the highest unemployment rate and one of
the highest proportions of homeownership from the OECD countries.
We have encountered that the OSWALD’s hypothesis is no longer true in the
case of Spanish regions. Furthermore, at the mean values, Spanish provinces
with 10 percentage points higher ownership rates have roughly 2.5 percentage
points lower the unemployment rate. This result surely will please those policy
makers that have been carrying out economic policies aimed to promote the
access to housing in property, and at the same time, to reduce the unemploy-
ment rate. We conclude that, at least in the Spanish case, it doesn’t exist any
contradiction between both objectives.
As extensions of the present work, when the information of the population
and housing’s censuses that it is being realized along the year 2001 in Spain
were available, we propose to modify the model in order to deal with the
longitudinal data in a way that allows us to isolate the existence of provinces
effects, as well as to analyze the possibly variation of the effects produced by
the variables that we consider. Moreover, given the inclusion in the tenure
equation of variables as the relative user cost of owning and renting, the model
will permit us to simulate the impact on homeownership of alternative econo-
mic policies, as a variation in the tax legislation on housing. It will be of
enormous interest to carry out this last exercise to provide our policy makers
of a simple way to evaluate the incidence of diverse economic policies in terms
of facilitating the access to housing in property.
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5. APPENDIX A): EVALUATION OF THE RELATIVE COST
OF OWNING AND RENTING AT THE PROVINCIAL
LEVEL IN SPAIN
The user cost of the residential capital, in their two modes: in rent and in
property, can be defined as the final price (annual or total) that has to pay an
individual to enjoy the services generated by a housing unit.
Although several authors (HENDERSHOTT and SHILLING, 1982, FOLLAIN and
LING, 1991) argue that an appropriate measure of the user cost of the residential
capital must attend to the flow of present and future net rents that generates a
housing (total user cost), also in HENDERSHOTT and SHILLING (1982) or BA-
RRIOS (2001) it is showed that the dynamic or total focus, at least in their
discrete version, coincides with the annual one when some simplifying hypo-
thesis are added. In this paper we opt, as so many other authors, to use an
annual or instantaneous measure of the user cost.
To develop an indicator of the user cost of residential capital in their two
modes: in owning and in renting, we proceed in a similar, but not equal, way to
HAURIN et al. (1994), BOURASSA (1995), or ÅSBERG (1999), taking into account
the Spanish context. First, we take a characteristic housing in Spain of 90 m2
and we estimate on this basis both the user cost of renting or owning in the
following ways:
5.1. THE USER COST OF RENTING
We have obviated the tax provisions on renting in the Spanish case becau-
se its relative scarce importance. Thus we take as the user cost of renting at the
province level in Spain (CRH) just the average market rent for a housing of
these characteristics in each location.
5.2. THE USER COST OF OWNING
To obtain an indicator the user cost of owning we should proceed with
more thoroughness. In BARRIOS (2001) it is realized a theoretical survey of this
concept in the Spanish context, arriving to the following expression of the
annual user cost of the residential capital in property:
COH = OCE + MOR + DEP + MAN + IBI + IRPFH - ∆HP (1A)
or, in unitary terms, in proportion to the market price of the housing pH:
COH = (OCE + MOR + DEP + MAN + IBI + IRPFH - ∆HP)/pH (2A)
where the different components that appear in these expressions are defi-
ned as following:
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a) If pH represents the nominal price of housing (to the producer), the final
price (pf) to the buyer should include the payment of VAT (IVA) if it is a
new construction housing or the transmission tax (ITP) if it is a second
hand housing. To that amount would be necessary to add the payment
for the formalization of entitlement (IAJD) and of the mortgage
contract in the case of acquisition with a mortgage loan. Thus, we can
write:
pf = (1 + τITP) pH (3A)
where τITP = tITP + tIAJD + cMOR, being tITP the VAT (IVA) or the
transmission tax rates, depending on the nature of housing, tIAJD
the proportion of pH paid for the formalization of entitlement, and
cMOR the formalization cost of the mortgage in proportion to pH.
b) If we denominate io the interest rate for the best alternative asset to the
housing with the same risk level, then, the opportunity cost of the own
funds invested in the acquisition of the housing (OCE) will come given,
after taxes, by:
OCE = (1 - τIRPF) io (1 - r) pf (4A)
with r the proportion of the final price of the housing that is financed in
the mortgage market, and τIRPF the individual marginal income tax
(IRPF) rate.
c) The capital gains (∆HP) represent the variation in the nominal price of
housing during the period. Taking into account that in Spain the capital
gains are only included in the taxable income in the event of sale of
housing, being exempt after a certain lapse from the acquisition, we
will simply suppose that they are free of taxation, and so their expres-
sion will be:
ΔHP= pH (t+ 1)− pH(t)pH(t) (5A)
where pH(t) is the average nominal price of housing at the year t. It
should be noticed that we have supposed that the individuals have a
perfect foresight of the capital gains in the current period.
d) If the mortgage interest rate is iMOR, the annual payment for interests
(MOR) will come given approximately by:
MOR = iMORrpf (6A)
e) We take the depreciation (DEP) and maintenance (MAN) as certain
proportions δ y m, respectively, of the house market value:
DEP + MAN = (δ + m) pH (7A)
f) We reduce the property taxes in Spain to the local tax on real estate
(IBI). This is established as a percentage τIBI of the registered value
of the property (cadastral value). This registered value of house is
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formalized as a proportion (k) of the market value of the house, and
thus we can write:
IBI = τIBIkpH (8A)
g) To determine the part of the income tax derived from the owning of
the habitual housing (IRPFH) we should follow the precepts of the
Spanish Law 18/1991 that affects to almost the whole decade of the
1990’s, with slight punctual modifications along the period that it has
been in force. This way we arrive to an expression as the following:
IRPFH = [τIRPF[(a - τIBI)k - τMORriMOR(1 + τITP)] - tdCa (1 + τITP)] pH (9A)
where:
This last above is a parameter that captures the existing limitation in the
income tax provisions to the deductibility of mortgage interest payments [it
should be noticed that all amounts are quantified in euros (€)], a is the implicit
income attributable to habitual housing in proportion to its cadastral value, Ca
is the amortized capital in the period for the mortgage loan in percentage of
the final price o housing (to what it may be necessary to add the quantity
of the house value not financed with the mortgage loan if we are located in the
period of the housing purchase), and td is the reduction rate recognized to
the amortized capital in the period. Also, in fact in the income tax provisions,
the sum of the investment deductions (among them that of investment in the
habitual housing) should be subjected to the limit of the 30 per cent of the total
taxable income. Here we will obviate the other investment deductions, and so it
should be verified that:
Capf ≤ 0.3 · (Taxable Income)
Assembling expressions (1A) - (9A), we proceed to evaluate an indicator
of the user cost of owning at the Spanish province level of the common tax
regime for the decade of the 1990’s [see appendix B) for sources of data].
Table 2 shows the evolution of this variable in unitary terms (in proportion to
the price of housing) at the beginning and at the end of the decade (it should be
noticed that in 1999 there was a change in the income tax legislation that
slightly modified the expression 9A, for more details see BARRIOS, 2001),
being also distinguished the user cost of owning net of the nominal inflation in
housing (without the component of capital gains ∆HP), which could be thought
more as an annual user cost in the accounting sense (since the implicit earnings
of the residential capital are only realized in the event of alienation of housing).
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TABLE 2
Estimated user cost of owning at the Spanish provinces
Unitary user cost
(%)
Unit. user cost (without ∆PV)
(%)
Provinces: 1991 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1991 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Albacete 13.1 6.5 3.7 5.7 2.5 - 4.2 16.3 10.4 8.6 7.0 6.6 7.7
Alicante 17.1 5.7 2.9 6.1 - 2.6 - 2.1 16.0 10.3 8.5 7.1 6.6 7.8
Almería 16.6 3.5 3.4 - 0.3 - 5.3 0.2 16.0 10.4 8.6 7.1 6.6 7.8
Ávila 13.0 0.9 5.5 1.5 3.0 4.3 16.3 10.5 8.7 7.3 6.6 7.8
Badajoz 18.0 14.0 8.1 4.7 2.7 4.0 16.4 10.5 8.7 7.3 6.6 7.6
Baleares 17.5 8.7 6.2 - 2.3 - 1.8 - 5.2 15.7 10.3 8.5 7.1 6.6 7.8
Barcelona 12.9 8.3 4.9 0.8 - 2.2 - 6.8 16.5 10.2 8.6 7.0 7.1 8.6
Burgos 12.6 6.7 1.1 1.3 - 2.2 - 3.4 15.9 10.2 8.4 7.0 6.8 8.0
Cáceres 18.0 11.7 13.2 5.5 2.3 4.9 16.3 10.5 8.6 7.3 6.6 7.7
Cádiz 16.6 13.0 6.0 4.3 - 2.3 - 2.4 16.0 10.4 8.6 7.1 6.7 7.9
Castellón 17.2 5.6 4.8 3.7 0.4 1.4 16.0 10.4 8.6 7.1 6.6 7.7
Ciudad Real 13.1 2.5 6.0 6.6 2.2 - 0.9 16.4 10.5 8.7 7.1 6.6 7.8
Córdoba 17.0 11.1 7.9 4.1 1.9 - 5.2 16.4 10.5 8.7 7.1 6.6 7.9
La Coruña 13.6 7.5 5.5 - 1.2 - 1.1 5.1 15.9 10.2 8.4 7.0 6.7 7.9
Cuenca 12.7 10.2 9.7 5.8 2.6 5.4 15.9 10.2 8.5 7.0 6.5 7.7
Gerona 12.1 7.8 2.3 - 0.6 - 3.3 - 2.1 15.7 10.3 8.5 7.1 6.7 7.8
Granada 17.0 3.7 11.4 3.5 - 3.3 - 4.2 16.3 10.4 8.5 7.0 6.6 7.8
Guadalajara 12.7 9.9 7.9 1.5 1.9 - 5.9 15.9 10.2 8.4 7.0 6.6 7.9
Huelva 16.6 10.0 4.8 1.3 - 4.7 - 1.1 16.0 10.4 8.6 7.1 6.6 7.8
Huesca 16.7 5.5 1.6 2.8 0.2 4.2 16.0 10.3 8.5 7.1 6.6 7.7
Jaén 16.9 8.6 6.7 5.4 0.6 - 3.9 16.3 10.5 8.6 7.3 6.6 7.7
León 12.4 8.2 7.4 2.2 - 6.9 - 2.2 15.7 10.2 8.5 7.1 6.7 7.9
Lérida 12.1 7.7 8.5 6.1 - 7.1 - 0.8 15.7 10.2 8.5 7.0 6.6 7.8
Logroño 8.8 8.3 7.8 3.9 - 2.7 - 6.3 15.7 10.2 8.4 6.8 6.6 7.8
Lugo 13.6 8.3 6.9 4.5 - 1.4 5.7 15.9 10.4 8.6 7.0 6.6 7.7
Madrid 19.9 10.9 4.2 2.1 - 1.6 - 1.5 16.6 10.0 8.5 6.9 6.9 8.4
Málaga 16.6 8.4 8.4 0.9 - 7.3 - 0.5 16.0 10.4 8.6 7.1 6.6 7.8
Murcia 18.8 10.8 5.3 1.9 - 4.0 - 3.6 16.0 10.4 8.6 7.1 6.6 7.8
Orense 13.6 4.9 3.5 2.9 - 0.9 - 1.1 15.9 10.4 8.5 7.0 6.6 7.8
Oviedo 20.5 9.6 4.3 3.4 - 3.9 - 3.2 15.8 10.3 8.5 7.1 6.8 8.0
Palencia 12.6 5.6 5.3 2.0 2.8 0.9 16.0 10.2 8.5 7.0 6.6 7.8
Las Palmas
de G.C. 19.3 6.3 2.5 - 5.4 - 2.0 - 8.5 16.0 10.2 8.5 7.0 6.7 7.9
Pontevedra 13.4 10.6 7.3 4.7 1.5 4.1 15.7 10.2 8.5 7.0 6.6 7.8
Salamanca 13.1 6.1 9.2 3.5 - 2.9 - 3.1 16.4 10.5 8.6 7.3 6.7 7.9
Santa Cruz
de Tfe. 19.3 6.4 6.5 - 0.1 - 2.1
- 10.
6 16.0 10.4 8.6 7.1 6.7 7.9
Santander 7.5 6.1 5.8 4.0 1.8 2.8 16.1 10.3 8.5 7.0 6.7 7.9
Segovia 12.7 3.2 8.8 2.1 3.0 1.9 16.0 10.4 8.5 7.0 6.6 7.8
Sevilla 16.6 8.0 5.5 - 2.7 - 4.3 - 1.5 16.0 10.3 8.5 7.1 6.7 7.9
Soria 12.7 10.2 7.2 0.4 - 2.0 - 1.2 16.0 10.2 8.4 7.0 6.6 7.8
Tarragona 12.1 10.3 4.3 - 2.8 - 1.9 - 6.1 15.7 10.3 8.5 7.1 6.7 7.9
Teruel 16.7 0.5 2.4 2.4 3.0 4.2 16.0 10.4 8.6 7.0 6.6 7.7
Toledo 13.1 7.2 5.7 1.4 1.4 2.3 16.3 10.3 8.5 7.0 6.5 7.7
Valencia 17.2 5.7 6.1 3.6 - 5.2 - 0.2 16.0 10.4 8.6 7.1 6.7 7.9
Valladolid 12.4 14.2 3.8 - 0.1 - 6.0 - 2.3 15.7 10.2 8.5 7.0 6.7 7.9
Zamora 13.0 5.0 2.1 3.7 - 6.2 - 3.3 16.3 10.4 8.5 7.0 6.6 7.8
Zaragoza 16.7 6.2 4.6 - 0.8 - 3.3 - 4.9 16.0 10.3 8.4 7.0 6.7 7.9
National
Means 14.9 7.6 5.8 2.3 - 1.5 - 1.2 16.0 10.3 8.5 7.1 6.6 7.9
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6. APPENDIX B): VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES
TEN: Homeownership rate at the province level in Spain. Source: INE.
Census of housing. 1991.
UNE: Unemployment rate at the province level in Spain. Source: INE.
Active population survey (EPA). 1991.
LUNE89: Logarithm of the unemployment rate at the province level in
Spain. Source: INE. Active population survey (EPA). 1989.
PO2039: Proportion in unitary terms of the population between 20 and 39
years, inclusive both ends, on the total population of each Spanish province.
Source: INE: Census of population. 1991.
DISEWI: Percentage of the population at the Spanish provinces that pre-
sents the marital status of divorced, separated, or widowed (expressed in uni-
tary terms). Source: INE: Census of population. 1991.
LINC: Logarithm of per capita disposable income at the Spanish province
level. Source: Fundación BBVA: National Income in Spain and its provincial
distribution. 1995 and advances to 1996-1999.
∆COH/CRH: First difference of the relative cost of owning and renting, that
is in 1991: ∆COH/CRH = COH91/CRH91 - COH90/CRH90. To obtain this indica-
tor, we proceed as it is explained in Appendix A) based on the following
suppositions and sources of data:
Source for the average market rent at the Spanish province level: Rodrí-
guez de Acuña y Asoc.
Sources and Suppositions to evaluate the indicator of the user cost of
owning at the Spanish province level:
1) We take as the mortgage interest rate (iMOR) the annual series of the
average mortgage interest rate for the overall group of credit firms in
the mortgage loan contracts to more than three years for acquisition
of not subsidised housing. Source: Boletín estadístico del Banco de Es-
paña.
2) The rate of the opportunity cost of the housing equity (io) coincides
with the 10 year treasury-bonds rate. Source: Boletín estadístico del
Banco de España.
3) We assume the ratio of the mortgage loan on the final price of housing
as r = 0.8. Recent studies on the mortgage market in Spain have shown
that this is approximately the mean loan-to-value ratio. Similar values
were taken in GREEN and VANDELL (1999).
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4) The depreciation and maintenance rates are considered to sum 3 per
cent. In the literature this sum usually moves between 2 per cent and 4
per cent (ROSEN and ROSEN, 1980; ROSEN et al., 1984; GREEN and VAN-
DELL, 1999).
5) The value of the tax rate that burdens the transmission of the housing
τITP [VAT (IVA) if it is a new construction and a transaction tax (ITP) if
it is a second hand one, plus the cost of formalizing the entitlement
(IAJD) and the mortgage contract] is taken to be a 7.3 per cent of the
housing price [we arrive to this value compiling a tax rate of the ITP or
VAT (IVA) of 6 per cent, plus 0.5 per cent of the IAJD, plus 0.8 per
cent = 1 per cent ⋅80 per cent as the cost of formalization of the mortga-
ge loan].
6) We have taken a characteristic housing of 90 m2, evaluating its price
from an annual average market housing price series for new construc-
tions in each of the provincial capitals. As well from this series we have
calculated the capital gains component (∆HP). Source: Sociedad de Ta-
sación.
7) The average income of the households at the province level in Spain in
1991 is that picked up from the Spanish survey of household’s budgets
of 1990/91. To obtain the corresponding income data in other years we
update the 1991 data with the help of the general price index. We prefer
this variable in front of others as the average wage at the province level
because the former include all the income components, and not only
those coming exclusively from work. Source: INE. Encuesta de Presu-
puestos Familiares 1990/91.
8) The property tax rate (τIBI) to be applied at the province level is taken as
the average urban IBI tax rate in each one. Furthermore, the cadastral
value (the basis of the property tax) is assumed to be a proportion of
k = 0.28 of the house value. Source: Local taxes (Tax rates, indexes and
coefficients). General Direction of Coordination with the Territorial
Treasury. Ministry of Economy and Treasury. Spain.
9) Based on the average incomes of households at the province level, it is
calculated the marginal tax rate. Source: Annual tributary report of the
Ministry of Economy and Treasury. 1991.
10) Also, in the calculation of the component IRPFH it is assumed that the
implicit return of the habitual housing is, as a general norm, a = 2 per
cent of the cadastral value. The reduction rate recognized to the amorti-
zed capital in the period is taken td = 15 per cent. The amortized capital
in the period is adopted as a fraction Ca = 2 per cent of the final price of
the housing, this value corresponds in average with the amortized quan-
tity in the first years, under the mortgage contract regulation most ex-
tended in Spain (that is what it is called the French method of amortiza-
tion and an average duration of the mortgage loan of 15-25 years).
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